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Abstract
We consider an infinite horizon economy where agents share income risks by trading a complete set of
contingent claims but cannot commit to their promises. Allocations are restricted to be self-enforcing
relative to autarchic reservation utilities. We provide a general characterization of constrained Pareto
efficiency without assuming that there are uniform gains to trade. Our results extend those in Bloise and
Reichlin (2011) in several aspects.
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1. Introduction
The paper studies infinite horizon exchange
economies with complete contingent claims markets
when there is no commitment and default induces
permanent exclusion from future trading. As in
Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Kehoe and Levine
(1993), trade is subject to participation constraints
that restrict allocations to be self-enforcing relative
to autarchic reservation utilities.1 The presence of
such constraints and the associated imperfect risk-
sharing imply that the economy cannot attain a so-
cial optimum. An important issue is then to explore
under which conditions an allocation is constrained
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1Alvarez and Jermann (2000) propose a sequential for-
mulation of this model where agents trade a complete set
of contingent bonds every period. The focus is on endoge-
nously determined agent-specific debt limits that correspond
to participation constraints at autarchic reservation utilities.
Such limits on borrowing are referred in the literature as not-
too-tight debt constraints.
Pareto efficient, that is, to identify necessary and
sufficient conditions that rule out benefits from re-
distributions given the participation constraints.
Following the classical approach in general equi-
librium, Bloise and Reichlin (2011) provide an in-
teresting treatment of this matter by characterizing
constrained Pareto efficiency in terms of supporting
linear functionals. They show that under uniform
gains to trade, the support by a linear functional
is a necessary and sufficient condition for interior
(uniformly bounded away from zero) allocations to
be constrained Pareto efficient. Furthermore, they
show that any supporting linear functional admits
a sequential representation, in the sense that its
purely additive part (bubble component) is null.
This allows them to compare their characterization
result with that provided by Alvarez and Jermann
(2000) formulated in terms of high implied inter-
est rates (i.e., state-contingent prices that imply a
finite present value of the intertemporal aggregate
endowment).2
Bloise and Reichlin (2011) also study constrained
Pareto efficiency in the absence of uniform gains to
trade (still restricting attention to allocations that
are uniformly bounded away from zero). They iden-
2Bloise and Reichlin (2011) show by means of an exam-
ple that the assumption of uniform gains to trade is indis-
pensable. Without it, constrained Pareto efficiency does not
necessarily lead to high implied interest rates.
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tify a strong connection between constrained Pareto
inefficiency and two variants of the Cass Criterion
originally proposed for stochastic overlapping gen-
erations economies. However, they only identify
a necessary and sufficient condition under the as-
sumption of uniform gains to trade.
This paper aims at looking at constrained Pareto
efficiency from a fresh perspective. The main objec-
tive is to provide a complete characterization, free
of the assumption of uniform gains to trade. More
precisely, we show that an allocation is constrained
Pareto efficient if, and only if, it can be approx-
imated by a sequence of constrained Pareto effi-
cient allocations associated to perturbed economies
where a physical asset in positive net supply is in-
troduced. The proof of this result unfolds in two
steps.
First, we prove that under uniform gains to trade,
high implied interest rates are necessary and suffi-
cient for constrained Pareto efficiency, even if we
dispense with the interiority restriction imposed in
Bloise and Reichlin (2011). The novel aspects of
this step are as follows. On one hand, to prove suf-
ficiency, there is no need to assume uniform gains
to trade. We propose a new decentralization re-
sult that explores the concavity of Bernoulli func-
tions and identifies sufficient conditions for state-
contingent prices to belong to the constrained sub-
differential of expected utilities. On the other hand,
to prove necessity, we show that if a linear func-
tional supports a constrained Pareto efficient allo-
cation, then it cannot have a bubble component and
must coincide with the process of implied Arrow–
Debreu prices (which turns out to display high in-
terest rates).
It is easy to verify that the assumption of uni-
form gains to trade is automatically satisfied in any
perturbed economy in which the dividend process is
sufficiently large with respect to the aggregate en-
dowment process. The second step then involves to
exploit the characterization result of the first step
to prove that an allocation that satisfies the Euler
equations is constrained Pareto efficient if, and only
if, it is the limit of allocations exhibiting high im-
plied interest rates. We say that such allocations
exhibit “almost high implied interest rates”.
We illustrate the usefulness of our general charac-
terization result for the standard stationary Marko-
vian economy with two agents, two shocks and
no aggregate uncertainty. Constrained Pareto ef-
ficiency of the autarchic allocation is then charac-
terized by means of the income dispersion param-
eter. We also compare our results with those in
Bloise and Reichlin (2011) and show that, in the
absence of uniform gains to trade, our necessary
and sufficient condition is strictly weaker than their
sufficient condition and strictly stronger than their
necessary condition.
We show in a supplementary material (Martins-
da-Rocha and Vailakis (2015)) that our character-
ization result has direct implications for the valid-
ity of the Second Welfare Theorem. Indeed, stan-
dard arguments can be applied to show that any
constrained Pareto efficient allocation is supported
by some linear functional. This linear functional
has no bubble component, and must coincide with
the implied contingent-state prices. In particular,
implied interest rates are high and we can deduce
(using our decentralization result) that any con-
strained Pareto efficient allocation can be imple-
mented as a constrained competitive equilibrium
with high interest rates and endogenous transfers.
We also strengthen the Second Welfare Theorem
by characterizing the set of consumption allocations
implemented as constrained competitive equilibria
with high interest rates and zero initial transfers.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 de-
scribes the environment and provides the definitions
of the various concepts used throughout the pa-
per. As an intermediate step, Section 3 contains our
characterization of constrained Pareto efficiency un-
der uniform gains to trade. The general character-
ization follows in Section 4. A discussion on how
our results differentiate from those in Bloise and
Reichlin (2011) are collected in Appendix A. The
details of some technical results can be found in
the supplementary material.
2. The Model
Here we present an infinite horizon exchange
economy with lack of commitment and self-
enforcing participation constraints, along the lines
of Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Bloise and Reichlin
(2011). Time and uncertainty are both discrete and
there is a single non-storable consumption good.
The economy consists of a finite set I of infinitely
lived agents that share risks but cannot commit to
future transfers.
2.1. Uncertainty
We use an event tree Σ to describe time, uncer-
tainty and the revelation of information over an in-
finite horizon. There is a unique initial date-0 event
2
s0 ∈ Σ and for each date t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} there is a
finite set St ⊂ Σ of date-t events st. Each st has a
unique predecessor σ(st) in St−1 and a finite num-
ber of successors st+1 in St+1 for which σ(st+1) =
st. We use the notation st+1  st to specify that
st+1 is a successor of st. Event st+τ is said to follow
event st, also denoted st+τ  st, if σ(τ)(st+τ ) = st.
The set St+τ (st) := {st+τ ∈ St+τ : st+τ  st}
denotes the collection of all date-(t+τ) events fol-
lowing st. Abusing notation, we let St(st) := {st}.
The subtree of all events starting from st is then
Σ(st) :=
⋃
τ≥0
St+τ (st).
We use the notation sτ  st when sτ  st or sτ =
st. In particular, we have Σ(st) = {sτ ∈ Σ : sτ 
st}.
2.2. Endowments and Preferences
Agents’ endowments are subject to random
shocks. We denote by ei = (ei(st))st∈Σ agent i’s
process of positive endowments ei(st) > 0 of the
consumption good contingent to event st. Pref-
erences over (non-negative) consumption processes
c = (c(st))st∈Σ are represented by the lifetime ex-
pected and discounted utility functional
U(c) :=
∑
t≥0
βt
∑
st∈St
pi(st)u(c(st)),
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, pi(st) is
the unconditional probability of st and u : R+ →
[−∞,∞) is a Bernoulli function assumed to be
strictly increasing, concave, continuous on R+, dif-
ferentiable on (0,∞), bounded from above and sat-
isfying Inada’s condition at the origin.3
Given a date-t event st, we denote by U(c|st) the
lifetime continuation utility conditional to event st,
defined by
U(c|st) := u(c(st))
+
∑
τ≥1
βτ
∑
st+τst
pi(st+τ |st)u(c(st+τ )),
3The function u is said to satisfy the Inada’s condition
at the origin if limε→0[u(ε) − u(0)]/ε = ∞. This property
is automatically satisfied if u(0) = −∞. We assume that
agents’ preferences are homogeneous. This is only for the
sake of simplicity. All arguments can be adapted to han-
dle the heterogeneous case where the preference parameters
(β, pi, u) differ among agents.
where pi(st+τ |st) := pi(st+τ )/pi(st) is the condi-
tional probability of st+τ given st. We assume
that U(ei|s0) > −∞ for every agent i.4 Since the
bernoulli function is bounded from above, we then
get that U(ei|st) > −∞ for all event st.
A collection (ci)i∈I of consumption processes is
called an allocation. It is said to be resource
feasible if
∑
i∈I c
i =
∑
i∈I e
i.
2.3. Self-Enforcing Consumption
A consumption process ci may involve transfers
contingent to an event st if ci(st) < ei(st). We as-
sume that agent i cannot commit to future transfers
and has the option to walk away from a contract.
We follow Kehoe and Levine (1993) (see also Bloise
and Reichlin (2011)) and assume that autarky is
the outside option for not fulfilling promises. A
consumption process ci is then said to be self-
enforcing if it satisfies the following participation
constraints
U(ci|st) ≥ U(ei|st), for all st  s0.
When the participation constraint is also satisfied
at the initial event s0, i.e., U(ci|s0) ≥ U(ei|s0), then
ci is said to be individually rational.
2.4. Implied Interest Rates
A consumption process ci is said to be strictly
positive if ci(st) > 0 for every event st. In that
case, we can define agent i’s marginal rate of sub-
stitution at event st by posing
MRS(ci|st) := βpi(st|σ(st)) u
′(ci(st))
u′(ci(σ(st)))
.
Given a strictly positive allocation (ci)i∈I , we let
p? = (p?(st))st∈Σ be the process defined recursively
by p?(s0) := 1 and
p?(st)
p?(σ(st))
:= max
i∈I
MRS(ci|st), for all st  s0.
Following Alvarez and Jermann (2000), p? is called
the process of implied Arrow–Debreu prices.
Given an arbitrary strictly positive process p =
(p(st))sts0 interpreted as Arrow–Debreu prices, we
4This assumption is automatically satisfied if either
u(0) > −∞ or the allocation (ei)i∈I is uniformly bounded
away from zero, in the sense that there exists ε > 0 such
that ei(st) ≥ ε for each agent i and event st.
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use PV(p;x|st) to denote the present value at date-
t event st of a process x restricted to the subtree
Σ(st) and defined by
PV(p;x|st) := 1
p(st)
∑
st+τ∈Σ(st)
p(st+τ )x(st+τ ).
We say that p displays high interest rates when the
present value of endowments under the price pro-
cess p is finite, i.e., PV(p; ei|s0) < ∞, for all i.5
A strictly positive allocation (ci)i∈I is said to have
high implied interest rates when the implied
Arrow–Debreu prices p? display high interest rates.
2.5. Commodity and Price Space
Denote by `∞(e) the linear space of processes h ∈
RΣ satisfying
∃λ ≥ 0, ∀st ∈ Σ, |h(st)| ≤ λe(st), (2.1)
where e :=
∑
i∈I e
i is the process of the aggregate
endowment. The linear space `∞(e) is the natu-
ral commodity space since we necessarily have ci ∈
`∞(e) for any resource feasible allocation (ci)i∈I .
Remark 2.1. Denote by `∞+ := `
∞
+ (1Σ) the space of
non-negative processes that are uniformly bounded
from above.6 Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Bloise
and Reichlin (2011) assume that endowments be-
long to `∞+ and restrict each agent to choose a con-
sumption process in `∞+ . In addition, Bloise and
Reichlin (2011) assume that the consumption and
endowment processes are uniformly bounded away
from zero.7 In contrast to those papers, we do not
impose any boundedness condition neither on en-
dowments nor on consumption processes.
We endow the space `∞(e) with the norm ‖h‖e
defined as the lowest λ ≥ 0 satisfying (2.1). Equiv-
alently, we have ‖h‖e := supst∈Σ |h(st)/e(st)|. The
cone of non-negative processes in `∞(e) is denoted
by `∞+ (e).
5Observe that p displays high interest rates if, and only
if, the process pe belongs to `1+–the set of convergent series
defined on Σ–where pe(st) := p(st)e(st).
6For any subset A ⊆ Σ, we denote by 1A the process x =
(x(st))st∈Σ defined by x(st) := 1 if st ∈ A and x(st) := 0
elsewhere.
7A process x = (x(st))st∈Σ is said to be uniformly
bounded away from zero whenever there exists ε > 0 such
that x(st) ≥ ε for every st ∈ Σ. Bloise and Reichlin (2011)
use the term “interior” for “uniformly bounded away from
zero”. This is because a process x is uniformly bounded away
from zero if, and only if, it belongs to the ‖·‖1Σ -interior of
`∞+ , where ‖x‖1Σ := supst∈Σ |x(st)|.
The ‖·‖e-topological dual of `∞(e) is denoted by
ba(e), and the subset of non-negative linear func-
tionals in ba(e) is denoted by ba+(e).
8 For any
linear functional ϕ ∈ ba+(e), there exists a non-
negative charge νϕ of bounded variation on the σ-
algebra 2Σ (or, equivalently, νϕ is a finitely additive
positive measure), such that
ϕ(h) =
∫
hedν
ϕ,
where he is the process in `
∞ defined by he(st) :=
h(st)/e(st). In particular, any ϕ ∈ ba+(e) can be
decomposed as follows
ϕ(h) = PV(pϕ;h|s0)+ϕ0(h), for every h ∈ `∞(e),
for some non-negative process pϕ satisfying
PV(pϕ; e|s0) < ∞ and some non-negative purely
finitely additive linear functional ϕ0.9
Remark 2.2. Any non-zero and non-negative linear
functional defined on `∞(e) necessarily belongs to
ba+(e). Indeed, continuity follows from the fact
that e belongs to the ‖·‖e-interior of `∞+ (e).
A linear functional ϕ : `∞(e) → R is said to be
strictly positive whenever ϕ(h) > 0 for any non-zero
h ∈ `∞+ (e). Observe that if ϕ is strictly positive,
then ϕ is ‖·‖e-continuous (i.e., ϕ ∈ ba+(e)) and
pϕ(st) > 0 for any event st.
A price system is any arbitrary strictly posi-
tive linear functional ϕ normalized by the condi-
tion: pϕ(s0) = 1. A Bewley price process is a
strictly positive process p = (p(st))st∈Σ such that
p(s0) = 1 and PV(p; e|s0) is finite (i.e., p displays
high interest rates). Observe that any process pϕ
associated to a price system ϕ is necessarily a Be-
wley price process. The purely finitely additive
part ϕ0 = ϕ−PV(pϕ; ·|s0) is also called the bubble
component of the price system ϕ.
2.6. Uniform Gains to Trade
Following Bloise and Reichlin (2011), we say that
the economy exhibits uniform gains to trade if
8A linear functional ϕ : `∞(e) → R is said to be non-
negative whenever ϕ(h) ≥ 0 for every h ∈ `∞+ (e).
9The purely finitely additive linear functional ϕ0 can be
characterized as follows: it is a linear and ‖·‖e-continuous
functional on `∞(e) such that ϕ0(h) = ϕ0(h[T ]) where h[T ]
is the tailed process defined by h[T ](st) = h(st) if t ≥ T and
0 elsewhere. Observe moreover that pϕ(st) = ϕ(1{st}) for
any event st.
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there is an individually rational and self-enforcing
allocation (di)i∈I and γ > 0 such that
∀st ∈ Σ,
∑
i∈I
di(st) ≤ (1− γ)e(st), (2.2)
where we recall that e(st) :=
∑
i∈I e
i(st).
This condition means that autarky can be Pareto
improved, subject to participation constraints, even
though a constant fraction of aggregate endow-
ments is destroyed. In Section 4.1 we consider a
simple extension of our environment with a seizable
physical asset and provide sufficient conditions en-
suring that the economy exhibits uniform gains to
trade.
3. Constrained Pareto Efficiency under Uni-
form Gains to Trade
We consider the following definition of Pareto
dominance: an allocation (c˜i)i∈I Pareto dom-
inates another allocation (ci)i∈I if U(c˜i|s0) ≥
U(ci|s0) for every agent i, with a strict inequality
for at least one agent. We first recall the concept of
constrained Pareto efficiency introduced in Kehoe
and Levine (1993).
Definition 3.1. An allocation (ci)i∈I is con-
strained Pareto efficient if it is resource feasible,
self-enforcing, individually rational and if there is
no other allocation (c˜i)i∈I that is also resource fea-
sible, self-enforcing and individually rational which
Pareto dominates (ci)i∈I .
Remark 3.1. If an allocation (ci)i∈I is constrained
Pareto efficient, then it must be strictly positive.10
In particular, the corresponding process p? of im-
plied Arrow–Debreu prices is well-defined.
The objective of this section is to provide a com-
plete characterization of constrained Pareto effi-
ciency in terms of implied Arrow–Debreu prices un-
der the assumption of uniform gains to trade.
3.1. Constrained Pareto Efficiency and Supporting
Price Systems
We first characterize constrained Pareto effi-
ciency in terms of supporting price systems.
10See Proposition 2.1 in Martins-da-Rocha and Vailakis
(2015) for a detailed proof of this claim.
Definition 3.2. A linear functional ϕ : `∞(e) →
R supports a resource feasible, self-enforcing and
individually rational allocation (ci)i∈I if ϕ(c˜i) ≥
ϕ(ci) for any self-enforcing and individually rational
allocation (c˜i)i∈I that Pareto dominates (ci)i∈I .
Remark 3.2. Since preferences are strictly mono-
tone, a supporting linear functional ϕ must be non-
negative and ‖·‖e-continuous, i.e., ϕ must belong
to ba+(e). Under uniform gains to trade, the linear
functional ϕ must be strictly positive.11 Observe
that if ϕ supports (ci)i∈I , then for any λ > 0, the
linear functional λϕ also supports (ci)i∈I . We can
then, without any loss of generality, choose the nor-
malization ϕ(1{s0}) = pϕ(s0) = 1 and focus on sup-
porting linear functionals that are price systems.
It is shown below that if a price system ϕ sup-
ports an individually rational, self-enforcing and re-
source feasible allocation (ci)i∈I , then we can re-
place the inequality ϕ(c˜i) ≥ ϕ(ci) by the strict
inequality ϕ(c˜i) > ϕ(ci) whenever U(c˜i|s0) >
U(ci|s0). This allows us to obtain a sufficient con-
dition for constrained Pareto efficiency in terms of
supporting price systems.
Lemma 3.1. If a resource feasible, self-enforcing
and individually rational allocation is supported by
a price system, then it is constrained Pareto effi-
cient.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Consider a resource feasible,
self-enforcing and individually rational allocation
c = (ci)i∈I that is supported by a price system ϕ.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that there exists
a resource feasible, self-enforcing and individually
rational allocation c˜ = (c˜i)i∈I that Pareto domi-
nates c. To get a contradiction, it suffices to show
that ϕ(c˜i) > ϕ(ci) for each i. We can assume,
without any loss of generality, that c˜ is constrained
Pareto efficient. In particular, it is strictly positive
and for each i, we have c˜i(s0) > 0.12 By continuity
11See the proof of Lemma 5 in Bloise and Reichlin (2011).
An alternative argument is as follows. From a standard
convex separation argument, we can show that for every i,
there exists λi, µi ≥ 0 with (λi, µi) 6= (0, 0) such that
λi[U(c˜i|s0)− U(ci|s0)] ≤ µiϕ(c˜i − ci) for any self-enforcing
and individually rational consumption c˜i. Since ϕ(e) > 0, it
follows from the assumption of uniform gains to trade that
there exists an agent k ∈ I such that ϕ(dk) < ϕ(ck). This,
in turn, implies that λk > 0. Then, by strict monotonic-
ity of preferences, we get that µkϕ(v) > 0 for any non-zero
v ∈ `∞+ (e).
12See Proposition 2.1 in Martins-da-Rocha and Vailakis
(2015).
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of the Bernoulli function, there exists ε ∈ (0, c˜i(s0))
small enough such that U(c˜i−ε1{s0}|s0) > U(ci|s0).
Observe that the consumption process c˜i−ε1{s0} is
individually rational and self-enforcing. Since the
allocation c is supported by the price system ϕ, this
implies that ϕ(c˜i) − ε ≥ ϕ(ci) (recall that a price
system is such that pϕ(s0) = 1).
We next show that, under uniform gains to trade,
the support by a price system is a necessary con-
dition for a self-enforcing, individually rational and
resource feasible allocation to be constrained Pareto
efficient. In addition, any of such supporting price
system must coincide with the process of implied
Arrow–Debreu prices (which turns out to display
high interest rates).
Lemma 3.2. Assume there are uniform gains to
trade.
(i) A self-enforcing, individually rational and
resource feasible allocation is constrained
Pareto efficient only if it is supported by some
price system.
(ii) Any price system ϕ supporting a constrained
Pareto efficient allocation involves no bubble
component, i.e., ϕ(·) = PV(pϕ; ·|s0). More-
over pϕ coincides with p? the process of im-
plied Arrow–Debreu prices.13
Proof of Lemma 3.2. We first prove property (i).
Fix a constrained Pareto efficient allocation (ci)i∈I .
Let H be the set of all vectors h ∈ `∞(e) that can
be written as
h =
∑
i∈I
(
c˜i − ci) ,
where (c˜i)i∈I is a self-enforcing and individually ra-
tional allocation which Pareto dominates (ci)i∈I .
The set H is convex with a non-empty interior for
13Property (i) corresponds to Proposition 5 in Kehoe and
Levine (1993). The result generalizes the necessity part of
Lemma 5 in Bloise and Reichlin (2011) since (a) we prove
that property (ii) is valid for all allocations, not only for
those that are uniformly bounded away from zero, and (b)
we do not need to assume that aggregate endowments are
uniformly bounded from above and uniformly bounded away
from zero. Bloise and Reichlin (2011) need these additional
assumptions because their approach to prove property (ii) re-
quires that marginal utilities of consumption at constrained
Pareto efficient allocations are uniformly bounded from
above and uniformly bounded away from zero.
the ‖·‖e-topology.14 The constrained Pareto effi-
ciency of (ci)i∈I implies that 0 does not belong to
H. Applying the Convex Separation Theorem, we
get the existence of a non-zero and ‖·‖e-continuous
linear function ϕ : `∞(e) → R separating H and
{0} in the sense that ϕ(h) ≥ 0 for every h ∈ H.
This means that ϕ supports the allocation (ci)i∈I .
Uniform gains to trade ensure that ϕ is a price sys-
tem (see Remark 3.2).
We now prove property (ii). Let ϕ be a price sys-
tem supporting the allocation (ci)i∈I . Recall that
ϕ belongs to ba+(e), is strictly positive and is nor-
malized such that ϕ(1{s0}) = pϕ(s0) = 1.
Claim 3.1. The process pϕ dominates p?.
Proof. To prove the desired result, it is sufficient to
show that for each agent i, we have
MRS(ci|st) ≤ p
ϕ(st)
pϕ(σ(st))
, for all st  s0.
This property follows from a standard variational
argument. Indeed, fix an arbitrary event st and an
arbitrary agent i. For some χ > 1/MRS(ci|st) and
0 < ε < ci(σ(st)), we can define the process c˜i as
follows
∀sτ ∈ Σ, c˜i(sτ ) :=

ci(σ(st))− ε if sτ = σ(st)
ci(st) + χε if sτ = st
ci(sτ ) otherwise.
Observe that the process c˜i − ci is different from
zero only at the events σ(st) and st. This implies
that it belongs to `∞(e). Given the choice of χ, we
can choose ε > 0 small enough such that c˜i is self-
enforcing and U(c˜i|s0) > U(ci|s0).15 This implies
that
0 ≤ ϕ(c˜i − ci) = −pϕ(σ(st))ε+ pϕ(st)εχ.
Since χ can be chosen arbitrarily close to
1/MRSi(ci|st) we obtain the desired result.
14To see why the set H has non-empty interior for the ‖·‖e-
topology, we let c˜i := ci + e. Choose any process g in `∞(e)
with ‖g‖e < 1. We have that u(c˜i(st) + g(st)) > u(ci(st))
which implies that
∑
i∈I(c˜
i + g − ci) = #I(e + g) belongs
to H. Therefore, (#I)e belongs to the interior of H for the
‖·‖e-topology.
15Since u is concave, we have
pi(σ(st))u(c˜i(σ(st))) + pi(st)u(c˜i(st))
> pi(σ(st))u(ci(σ(st))) + pi(st)u(ci(st)).
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If agent i’s participation constraint is not binding
at event st, i.e., U(ci|st) > U(ei|st), then we can
replace ε > 0 by −ε in the arguments of Claim 3.1
to show that
pϕ(st)
pϕ(σ(st))
= MRS(ci|st) = p
?(st)
p?(σ(st))
.
If we show that for any event st, there exists at least
one agent for which the participation constraint is
not binding, then we get the desired result: pϕ =
p?. This property is guaranteed by the assumption
of uniform gains to trade.
Claim 3.2. At every event of Σ, there exists at
least one agent with a non-binding participation
constraint.
Proof. Fix an event st and assume by way of con-
tradiction that U(ci|st) = U(ei|st) for every i.
Let (di)i∈I be the individually rational and self-
enforcing allocation satisfying the inequality (2.2)
of uniform gains to trade. We pose
xi(sτ ) :=
{
ci(sτ ) if sτ 6∈ Σ(st)
di(sτ ) + (γ/#I)e(sτ ) if sτ  st.
Since di and ci are self-enforcing, the consump-
tion xi is also self-enforcing. Moreover,
U(xi|s0) =
t−1∑
r=0
∑
sr∈Sr
βrpi(sr)u(ci(sr))
+ βtpi(st)U(xi|st)
+
∑
σt∈St\{st}
βtpi(σt)U(ci|σt).
Since, U(xi|st) > U(ei|st) = U(ci|st), we get
that that U(xi|s0) > U(ci|s0). This contradicts the
constrained Pareto efficiency of (ci)i∈I .
At this point, we proved that pϕ = p?. We now
show that ϕ cannot have a bubble component, i.e.,
ϕ0(·) := ϕ(·)−PV(pϕ; ·|s0) = 0. Assume, by way of
contradiction, that there exists v ∈ `∞+ (e) such that
ϕ0(v) > 0. Since v belongs to `∞(e), it follows from
the assumption of uniform gains to trade that there
exists an individually rational and self-enforcing al-
location (f i)i∈I and µ > 0 such that16∑
i∈I
f i = −µv +
∑
i∈I
ci.
Fix ε > 0 small enough such that ϕ0(v) > ε/µ.
Since p? = pϕ displays high interest rates, there
exists a date τ large enough such that∑
sτ∈Sτ
p?(sτ ) PV(p?, e|sτ ) ≤ ε/2(#I).
For every event st such that t < τ , we pose xi(st) :=
ci(st). Choose r > τ and pose
xi(st) :=
{
e(st) if τ ≤ t < r
f i(st) if t ≥ r.
We have U(xi|st) ≥ U(f i|st) for any event st
with t ≥ τ . Observe that e(st) > ci(st) for any
event st. We can then choose r sufficiently large
to get that U(xi|sτ ) > U(ci|sτ ) for any sτ ∈ Sτ .
This, in turn, implies U(xi|st) > U(ci|st) for any
t < τ . We have thus proved that the consump-
tion process xi is self-enforcing, individually ratio-
nal and satisfies U(xi|s0) > U(ci|s0). It follows that
h =
∑
i∈I
(
xi − ci) belongs to H in which case we
have
0 ≤ ϕ(h) = PV(p?;h) + ϕ0(h). (3.1)
Observe that
PV(p?;h) ≤
∑
t≥τ
∑
st∈St
p?(st)|h(st)|
≤ (#I)
∑
t≥τ
∑
st∈St
p?(st)e(st)
≤ (#I)
∑
sτ∈Sτ
p?(sτ ) PV(p?; e|sτ )
≤ ε
2
. (3.2)
Since ϕ0 is purely finitely additive, we have17
ϕ0(h) = ϕ0(h[r]) = −µϕ0(v[r]) = −µϕ0(v) < −ε.
(3.3)
16Indeed, we have v ≤ ‖v‖e e. Choose µ := γ/ ‖v‖e and
observe that∑
i∈i
di + γ(e− (1/ ‖v‖e)v) = −µv +
∑
i∈I
ci.
We can then pose f i := di + γi(e− (1/ ‖v‖e)v) where γi :=
γ/(#I).
17Recall that for any process h = (h(st))st∈Σ, we denote
by h[r] the tailed process at date r > 0, defined by h[r](st) =
h(st) if t ≥ r and h[r](st) = 0 if t < r. In particular, for
h =
∑
i∈I
(
xi − ci), we have that h[r] = ∑i∈I(f i,[r]−ci,[r]).
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Combining (3.2) and (3.3) we get that ϕ(h) ≤ −ε/2
which contradicts (3.1).
3.2. Constrained Pareto Efficiency and High Im-
plied Interest Rates
The following lemma shows the necessity of high
implied interest rates for constrained Pareto effi-
ciency. Its proof follows as a direct corollary of
Lemma 3.2. This is because the price process pϕ
associated to a linear functional in ba+(e) automat-
ically satisfies PV(pϕ; e|s0) <∞.
Lemma 3.3. If there are uniform gains to trade,
then every constrained Pareto efficient allocation
exhibits high implied interest rates.18
Constrained Pareto efficiency obtains when there
are no mutual gains from trading, including the
trade opportunities involving transfers in the long
run. Malinvaud efficiency, instead, is a weaker no-
tion that requires the absence of any feasible wel-
fare improvement subject to resource feasibility and
participation constraints over any finite horizon.
Definition 3.3. An allocation (ci)i∈I is con-
strained Malinvaud efficient if it is resource
feasible, self-enforcing, individually rational and if
there is no other allocation (c˜i)i∈I that is also re-
source feasible, self-enforcing and individually ra-
tional which Pareto dominates (ci)i∈I and differs
from (ci)i∈I only on finitely many events.
Remark 3.3. Every constrained Pareto efficient al-
location is constrained Malinvaud efficient. If an al-
location (ci)i∈I is constrained Malinvaud efficient,
then it must be strictly positive.19 In particular,
the corresponding process p? of implied Arrow–
Debreu prices is well-defined. In addition, con-
strained Malinvaud efficiency has a tractable char-
acterization in terms of first order conditions: a
resource feasible, self-enforcing and individually ra-
tional allocation is constrained Malinvaud efficient
if, and only if, for all st  s0
U(ci|st) > U(ei|st) =⇒ MRS(ci|st) = p
?(st)
p?(σ(st))
.
When the above property is satisfied at any strict
successor event sτ  st, we say that Euler equa-
tions are satisfied at event st.
18This result is related to Lemma 2 in Bloise and Reichlin
(2011). We refer to Appendix A for a detailed discussion.
19See Proposition 2.1 in Martins-da-Rocha and Vailakis
(2015).
We next show that when implied interest rates
are high, Euler equations are sufficient for con-
strained Pareto efficiency.
Lemma 3.4. Any constrained Malinvaud efficient
allocation that exhibits high implied interest rates
is constrained Pareto efficient.20
Proof. Let (ci)i∈I be a constrained Malinvaud ef-
ficient allocation and assume that the associated
process p? of implied Arrow–Debreu prices exhibits
high interest rates. Since (ci)i∈I is constrained
Malinvaud efficient, we know that MRS(ci|st) =
p?(st)/p?(σ(st)) if U(ci|st) > U(ei|st). We can
then apply Proposition 2.2 in Martins-da-Rocha
and Vailakis (2015) to get that
1
u′(ci(s0))
[
U(c˜i|s0)− U(ci|s0)] ≤ PV(p?; c˜i−ci|s0),
for any resource feasible, self-enforcing and individ-
ually rational allocation (c˜i)i∈I .21 Summing over i
the above inequalities, we get that∑
i∈I
1
u′(ci(s0))
[
U(c˜i|s0)− U(ci|s0)] ≤ 0.
It follows that (c˜i)i∈I cannot Pareto dominate
(ci)i∈I . Therefore, we proved that (ci)i∈I is con-
strained Pareto efficient.
Combining Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.4, we get
a complete characterization of constrained Pareto
efficiency under uniform gains to trade.
Proposition 3.1. Assume there are uniform gains
to trade. A constrained Malinvaud efficient alloca-
tion is constrained Pareto efficient if, and only if,
implied prices exhibit high interest rates.22
4. A General Characterization of Con-
strained Pareto Efficiency
The crucial assumption imposed so far is that
there are uniform gains to trade. The objective of
this section is to provide a necessary and sufficient
20This result is related to Lemma 3 in Bloise and Reichlin
(2011). We refer to Appendix A for a detailed discussion.
21If (c˜i)i∈I is a resource feasible allocation, then each
consumption process satisfies c˜i ≤ e, which implies that
PV(p?; c˜i|s0) is finite.
22Proposition 3.1 generalizes Proposition 3 in Bloise and
Reichlin (2011). We refer to Appendix A for a detailed com-
parison.
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condition for constrained Pareto efficiency in full
generality by dropping this condition. In particular,
we show that an allocation is constrained Pareto ef-
ficient if, and only if, it can be approximated by a
sequence of constrained Pareto efficient allocations
associated to perturbed economies where the as-
sumption of uniform gains to trade is always satis-
fied. The perturbed economies are a particular case
of the following simple extension of our environment
where a physical and seizable asset is introduced.23
4.1. Seizable Assets
Following Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Kehoe
and Levine (2001), we assume that there is a phys-
ical asset (a tree) in positive net supply delivering
the dividend ξ(st) ≥ 0 at every event st. At the ini-
tial event s0, each agent i holds a fraction θi(s0) ≥ 0
of the tree, with
∑
i∈I θ
i(s0) = 1. The aggregate re-
sources to be allocated among agents at event st are
now
ω(st) := ξ(st) +
∑
i∈I
ei(st)
and an allocation (ci)i∈I is said to be resource fea-
sible whenever∑
i∈I
ci = ω = ξ +
∑
i∈I
ei. (4.1)
Following the interpretation proposed by Kehoe
and Levine (1993), the private endowment ei(st)
represents goods and services, such as labor, that
cannot be physically disassociated from the agent.
The shares of the physical asset (such as land) can
change hands, and therefore can be seized in case
of breach of contract. Therefore, the default op-
tion at event st is still represented by U(ei|st) and
the definition of an individually rational and self-
enforcing allocation remains unchanged. In partic-
ular, the definition of a constrained Pareto efficient
allocation remains the same except for the resource
feasibility constraint that is now defined by (4.1).
The commodity space `∞(e) is replaced by `∞(ω).
All the results presented above remain valid un-
der the uniform gains to trade assumption which
takes now the following form: the economy exhibits
uniform gains to trade if there is an individ-
ually rational and self-enforcing allocation (di)i∈I
and γ > 0 such that
∀st ∈ Σ,
∑
i∈I
di(st) ≤ (1− γ)ω(st). (4.2)
23By physical asset we mean an asset in positive net sup-
ply.
We show below that if the dividend process ξ is
large enough with respect to the private aggregate
endowment process e, then the assumption of uni-
form gains to trade is automatically satisfied.
Proposition 4.1. If there exists a fraction α > 0
such that ξ ≥ αe, i.e.,
ξ(st) ≥ α
∑
i∈I
ei(st), for any event st (4.3)
then the economy exhibits uniform gains to trade.
Proof. Observe that∑
i∈I
ei = e ≤ (1− γ)(ξ + e) = (1− γ)ω,
where γ := α/(1 + α). We can then choose (di)i∈I
such that
∑
i∈I d
i = (1−γ)ω and di ≥ ei for each i.
Remark 4.1. Condition (4.3) is satisfied if dividends
are uniformly bounded away from zero and private
endowments are uniformly bounded from above.
This is the case in stationary Markovian economies
with strictly positive dividends.
4.2. Almost High Implied Interest Rates
We have seen that any constrained Malinvaud ef-
ficient allocation that exhibits high implied interest
rates is constrained Pareto efficient. However, un-
less the economy exhibits uniform gains to trade,
the converse is not true in general (see Section 4.3
for an example). Our aim is to propose a weaker re-
quirement than high implied interest rates. For this
purpose, we introduce the concept of ε-perturbed
economies.
Definition 4.1. We denote by E(ε) the economy
in which we introduce a seizable physical asset in
positive net supply that delivers the fraction εe(st)
of the aggregate endowment at every event st. The
economy E(ε) is called the ε-perturbed economy.
A consumption allocation c = (ci)i∈I is said to
be ε-constrained Pareto (Malinvaud) efficient if it
is constrained Pareto (Malinvaud) efficient in the
economy E(ε).
Remark 4.2. In any ε-perturbed economy E(ε), the
outside option has the same value as in the orig-
inal economy E := E(0) without seizable physical
assets. This implies that a consumption plan is in-
dividually rational and self-enforcing in E(ε) if, and
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only if, it is individually rational and self-enforcing
in E . In particular, an allocation c = (ci)i∈I is ε-
constrained Malinvaud efficient if, and only if, (a)
it is individually rational and self-enforcing; (b) it
satisfies Euler equations; (c) it is ε-feasible.
We focus on allocations that can be approxi-
mated by a sequence of constrained Pareto efficient
allocations of perturbed economies.
Definition 4.2. A constrained Malinvaud efficient
allocation c = (ci)i∈I is said to exhibit almost
high implied interest rates if there exist a non-
negative sequence (εn) decreasing to 0 and a se-
quence (cn) of εn-constrained Malinvaud efficient
allocations, each exhibiting high implied interest
rates, that converges (for the product topology) to
the allocation c.
Observe that if an allocation c exhibits high im-
plied interest rates, then it also exhibits almost high
implied interest rates (it suffices to set εn := 0 and
cn := c). The converse is not true as shown in the
example presented in Section 4.3.
We can now formally state the main result of
this paper: “almost high implied interest rates” is
a necessary and sufficient condition for constrained
Pareto efficiency.
Theorem 4.1. Any constrained Malinvaud effi-
cient allocation is constrained Pareto efficient if,
and only if, it exhibits almost high implied interest
rates.
Proof. We first show that “almost high implied in-
terest rates” is a sufficient condition. Let c =
(ci)i∈I be a constrained Malinvaud efficient allo-
cation and assume that there exist a non-negative
sequence (εn) decreasing to 0 and a sequence (cn)
of εn-constrained Malinvaud efficient allocations ex-
hibiting high interest rates such that each (cin) con-
verges (for the product topology) to ci. It fol-
lows from Lemma 3.4 that the allocation (cin)i∈I is
constrained Pareto efficient for the economy E(εn).
This property is sufficient to get the desired re-
sult. Indeed, assume by way of contradiction, that
the allocation (ci)i∈I is not constrained Pareto ef-
ficient. Then, there exists an alternative feasi-
ble, individually rational and self-enforcing alloca-
tion (c˜i)i∈I that Pareto dominates (ci)i∈I . Without
any loss of generality, we can assume that (c˜i)i∈I
strongly Pareto dominates (ci)i∈I in the sense that
U(c˜i|s0) > U(ci|s0) for each agent i.24 Since (cin)
24Indeed, we can choose (c˜i)i∈I to be constrained Pareto
converges to ci and the mapping U(·|s0) is contin-
uous on the set of individually rational and self-
enforcing consumption processes (see Lemma 2.1
in Martins-da-Rocha and Vailakis (2015)), we can
deduce that there exists n large enough such that
(c˜i)i∈I strongly Pareto dominates the allocation
(cin)i∈I . This contradicts the constrained Pareto
efficiency of (cin)i∈I in the εn-perturbed economy.
We now prove that “almost high implied interest
rates” is a necessary condition. Let c = (ci)i∈I be
a constrained Pareto efficient allocation. For each
integer n ≥ 1, there exists a (1/n)-feasible alloca-
tion cˆn = (cˆ
i
n)i∈I satisfying cˆ
i
n ≥ ci.25 We can
assume without any loss of generality that cˆn is a
(1/n)-constrained Pareto efficient allocation. Ap-
plying Proposition 4.1 and Lemma 3.3 we deduce
that each allocation cˆn exhibits high implied inter-
est rates.
By feasibility, the sequence (cˆn) belongs to a
compact set and there exists a strictly increasing
function κ : N → N such that the subsequence
(cn) := (cˆκ(n)) converges to some allocation f =
(f i)i∈I which is feasible, individually rational and
self-enforcing. We claim that f = c. Indeed, since
U(cˆin|s0) ≥ U(ci|s0) for each i, passing to the limit
we get that the allocation f weakly Pareto dom-
inates c. Since c is constrained Pareto efficient,
this implies that U(f i|s0) = U(ci|s0) for each i.
Strict-concavity of Bernoulli functions implies that
we must have f = c. Letting εn := 1/κ(n), we get
the desired result.
Bloise and Reichlin (2011) introduced two vari-
ants of the Cass Criterion and show that one of
them is necessary and the other one is sufficient
for constrained Pareto efficiency. We show in Ap-
pendix A, by means of an example, that none of
these conditions is simultaneously sufficient and
necessary. This implies that our criterion is strictly
stronger than their necessary condition and strictly
weaker than their sufficient condition.26 In that
perspective, our Theorem 4.1 fills a gap in the liter-
ature. Moreover, we provide below an example to
efficient. It then follows from Proposition 2.1 in Martins-
da-Rocha and Vailakis (2015) that c˜i(s0) > 0 for each i.
We can then make a transfer from unconstrained agents to
constrained agents and obtain a strong Pareto improvement.
25It suffices to allocate the physical asset’s delivery
(1/n)e(st) among the consumers.
26When there are uniform gains to trade, the three condi-
tions coincide with the property that “implied interest rates
are high”.
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illustrate the applicability of our characterization
result.
4.3. An Application to Stationary Markovian
Economies
Here, we restrict attention to stationary Marko-
vian economies. Uncertainty is assumed to be rep-
resented by a simple Markov process on a finite
state space Z. An event st is then a t + 1-vector
(s0, s1, . . . , st) where each shock sτ ∈ Z and s0 ∈ Z
is fixed. In addition, the conditional probability
pi(st+1|st) is assumed to depend only on st and
st+1. We abuse notation and denote this condi-
tional probability by pi(st+1|st), implying that
pi(st) = pi(st|st−1)pi(st−1|st−2) . . . pi(s1|s0).
A process x = (x(st))st∈Σ is said to be stationary
Markovian if x(st) is a time invariant function of
the current shock st. We make a slight abuse of ter-
minology and use the notation x(st) for x(s
t−1, st).
We assume that agent i’s endowment process
is stationary Markovian. For any event st =
(st−1, st), the endowment ei(st−1, st) is denoted by
ei(st). It follows that the reservation utility pro-
cess is also stationary Markovian. Indeed, for ev-
ery event st = (st−1, st) we have U(ei|st) = V i(st)
where V i = (V i(z))z∈Z ∈ RZ is the unique solution
of the following recursive equations
∀z ∈ Z, Y (z) = u(ei(z)) + β
∑
z′∈Z
pi(z′|z)Y (z′).
When the process of endowments is stationary
Markovian, the condition of uniform gains to trade
is satisfied if, and only if, the autarchic allocation
(ei)i∈I is not constrained Pareto efficient. This re-
sult corresponds to Proposition 4 in Bloise and Re-
ichlin (2011). However, this result (combined with
the other results in Bloise and Reichlin (2011)) does
not allow to deduce a full characterization of con-
strained Pareto efficiency for stationary Markovian
economies. Indeed, if we know that the autarchic
allocation (ei)i∈I is constrained Pareto inefficient,
then any constrained Malinvaud efficient alloca-
tion is constrained Pareto efficient, if and only if,
it exhibits high interest rates. However, Bloise
and Reichlin (2011) do not provide any necessary
and sufficient condition in terms of prices to de-
termine whether the autarchic allocation is con-
strained Pareto inefficient. To illustrate this prob-
lem, we consider the standard stationary Marko-
vian symmetric economy with two agents and two
shocks.
There are two agents I = {i1, i2}. In each pe-
riod, one agent receives the high endowment 1 + σ
and the other receives the low endowment 1 − σ
where σ ∈ [0, 1]. Agents switch endowments with
probability 1− δ where δ ∈ (0, 1). Formally, uncer-
tainty is captured by the Markov process st, with
state space Z = {zi1 , zi2} and symmetric transition
probabilities
Prob(st+1 = zi|st = zi) = δ.
The endowment ei(st) only depends on the cur-
rent shock st, with e
i(st) = 1 + σ if st = zi and
ei(st) = 1−σ if st 6= zi. The question at issue is to
determine whether the autarchic allocation is con-
strained Pareto efficient. The answer naturally de-
pends on the values of the dispersion parameter σ.
We show below that there exists some threshold σm
such that
(i) if σ > σm, then the autarchic allocation is con-
strained Pareto inefficient since we can exhibit
a simple stationary Markovian allocation that
Pareto dominates the autarchic allocation;
(ii) if σ < σm, then the autarchic allocation is con-
strained Pareto efficient since it displays high
interest rates (the implied risk-less interest rate
is state invariant and strictly positive);27
(iii) if σ = σm, then the implied risk-less interest
rate is zero. No conclusion can be drawn from
the results stated in the literature, but we can
apply our characterization result to prove that
the autarchic allocation is constrained Pareto
efficient.28
To provide a formal proof of properties (i)–
(iii), we introduce the following notations. De-
fine Vh(σ) := U(e
i|(st−1, zi)) and V`(σ) :=
U(ei|(st−1, zj)) the autarchic continuation utility in
the high-endowment and low-endowment state re-
spectively, where zj 6= zi. We easily compute
(1− β)Vh(σ) = αu(1 + σ) + αu(1− σ)
and
(1− β)V`(σ) = αu(1 + σ) + αu(1− σ)
27Recall that any autarchic allocation is constrained Mal-
invaud efficient and Lemma 3.4 applies.
28The sufficient condition proposed in Bloise and Reichlin
(2011) is not satisfied. Indeed, since risk-less interest rate
is zero, the process v = (v(st))st∈Σ defined by v(st) := 1
satisfies the Weak Modified Cass Criterion introduced by
Bloise and Reichlin (2011). See Appendix A for details.
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where
α :=
1− βδ
(1− βδ) + (β − βδ) and α := 1− α.
The function V` is strictly decreasing. Moreover,
there exists σm such that Vh is strictly increasing
on [0, σm] and strictly decreasing on [σm, 1]. To sim-
plify the presentation, we assume that the primi-
tives (β, δ, u) are such that αu(2) + αu(0) < u(1).
It then follows that there exists σfb ∈ (σm, 1) such
that (1− β)Vh(σfb) = u(1).
Figure 1: Constrained efficient allocations
Observe that implied Arrow–Debreu prices sat-
isfy
p?(st+1)
p?(st)
= βδ =: qnc, if st+1 = st
and
p?(st+1)
p?(st)
= β(1−δ)u
′(1− σ)
u′(1 + σ)
=: qc(σ), if st+1 6= st.
The risk-less interest rate qnc+qc(σ) is state invari-
ant and satisfies29
∀σ < σm, qnc + qc(σ) < qnc + qc(σm) = 1.
This implies that if σ < σm, then the autarchic
allocation displays high implied interest rates and
29Observe that the first order conditions imply that
u′(1− σm)
u′(1 + σm)
=
α
α
=
1− βδ
β − βδ .
is therefore constrained Pareto efficient. We have
thus proved property (ii).
Observe that if σ ≥ σfb, then full insurance is
a feasible, individually rational and self-enforcing
allocation, which implies that the autarchic allo-
cation is constrained Pareto inefficient. Take now
σ in the interval (σm, σfb). There exists f(σ) ∈
(0, σm) such that Vh(f(σ)) = Vh(σ). Consider the
stationary Markovian allocation (ci)i∈I defined by
ci(st) := 1 + f(σ) if the endowment is high (i.e.,
st = zi) and c
i(st) := 1− f(σ) if the endowment is
low (i.e., st 6= zi). This allocation is individually ra-
tional, self-enforcing, feasible and Pareto dominates
the autarchic allocation. We have thus proved that
the autarchic allocation is constrained Pareto inef-
ficient if σ > σm. This corresponds to property (i).
The interesting case corresponds to σ = σm. We
will show that we can apply our Theorem 4.1 to
prove that the autarchic allocation is constrained
Pareto efficient. We would like to stress that neither
our Lemma 3.4 nor Lemma 3 in Bloise and Reichlin
(2011) can be applied to prove this result. This is
because the risk-less interest rates is zero.30.
Consider the economy where there is a seizable
physical asset in positive net supply that deliv-
ers ε ∈ (0, σm) at every event st. For any ξ ∈
[0, σm − ε/2], we let cε,ξ be the ε-feasible station-
ary Markovian allocation defined by
ciε,ξ(s
t) :=
{
1 + σm − ξ if st = zi
1− σm + ε+ ξ otherwise.
Define V εh (ξ) := U(c
i
ε,ξ|(st−1, zi)) and V ε` (ξ) :=
U(ciε,ξ|(st−1, zj)) the continuation utility in the
high-endowment and low-endowment state respec-
tively, where zj 6= zi. We easily compute
(1−β)V εh (ξ) = αu(1 +σm− ξ) +αu(1−σm + ε+ ξ)
and
(1−β)V ε` (ξ) = αu(1 +σm− ξ) +αu(1−σm + ε+ ξ).
Observe that the participation constraint at the
low endowment shock is satisfied for any value of
ξ ∈ [0, σm − ε/2].31 Moreover, the function V εh (·)
30The autarchic allocation satisfies the Weak Modified
Cass Criterion introduced in Bloise and Reichlin (2011). See
Appendix A for details
31This is because V ε` (ξ) > V`(σm − ξ) ≥ V`(σm).
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is strictly decreasing on the interval [0, σm− ε/2].32
We let ξ?(ε) be the largest value in [0, σm − ε/2]
for which the participation constraint at the high
endowment shock is satisfied. In other words, we
decrease the consumption at the high endowment
shock from 1 + σm until we either achieve the sym-
metric first best (for ξ = σm−ε/2) or until the par-
ticipation constraint binds. We claim that the as-
sociated allocation (cε,ξ?(ε)) is ε-constrained Pareto
efficient. It has been constructed to be ε-feasible,
individually rational and self-enforcing. Denote by
p?ε the implied Arrow–Debreu prices associated to
the allocation (cε,ξ?(ε)). We have
p?ε(s
t+1)
p?ε(s
t)
= βδ =: qnc,
if st+1 = st, and
p?ε(s
t+1)
p?ε(s
t)
= β(1− δ)u
′(1− σm + ε+ ξ?(ε))
u′(1 + σm − ξ?(ε)) =: q
c
ε,
if st+1 6= st.
Since
qcε = β(1− δ)
u′(ci(st+1))
u′(ci(st))
,
where i is the agent with the low endowment at
event st+1, we get that Euler equations are satis-
fied (or, equivalently, that (cε,ξ?(ε)) is ε-constrained
Malinvaud efficient). Moreover, the risk-less inter-
est rate satisfies
qnc + qcε ≤ qnc + β(1− δ)
u′(1− σm + ε)
u′(1 + σm)
< qnc + β(1− δ)u
′(1− σm)
u′(1 + σm)
= qnc + qc(σm) = 1.
We then get that the interest rates implied by the
allocation (cε,ξ?(ε)) are high. Finally, when ε tends
to 0, the optimal value ξ?(ε) also converges to 0.
This implies that
∀i ∈ I, lim
ε→0
ciε,ξ?(ε) = e
i.
Applying Theorem 4.1, we get that the autarchic
allocation is constrained Pareto efficient.
32This is because
(1− β) [V εh ]′ (ξ) = −αu′(1 + σm − ξ)
+αu′(1− σm + ε+ ξ)
< −αu′(1 + σm) + αu′(1− σm) = 0.
5. Conclusion
We propose a complete characterization of con-
strained Pareto efficiency under limited commit-
ment that does not require the assumption of “uni-
form gains to trade”. We show that an allocation
is constrained Pareto efficient if, and only if, it
can be approximated by a sequence of constrained
Pareto efficient allocations associated to perturbed
economies where a physical and seizable asset in
positive net supply is introduced. We illustrate the
usefulness of our general characterization result for
the standard stationary Markovian economy with
two agents, two shocks and no aggregate uncer-
tainty. We also compare our results with those in
Bloise and Reichlin (2011) and show that, in the
absence of uniform gains to trade, our necessary
and sufficient condition is strictly weaker than their
sufficient condition and strictly stronger than their
necessary condition.
Appendix
A. Comparing with the literature
Recall that if (ci)i∈I is a strictly positive con-
sumption process, then the implied Arrow–Debreu
price process p? is defined recursively by p?(s0) := 1
and
p?(st)
p?(σ(st))
:= max
i∈I
MRS(ci|st), for all st  s0.
Following Bloise and Reichlin (2011), we say that
an allocation satisfies the Modified Cass Crite-
rion when there exists a non-null, non-negative and
uniformly bounded from above process v satisfying,
for some ρ ∈ (0, 1),
ρ
∑
st+1st
p?(st+1)v(st+1) ≥ p?(st)v(st),
for all st  s0.
When this condition holds true for ρ = 1, we say
that the allocation satisfies the Weak Modified
Cass Criterion.
Bloise and Reichlin (2011) introduce a different
concept of “high implied interest rates” than the
one we borrow from Alvarez and Jermann (2000).
We say that implied interest rates are BR-high
when ∑
st∈Σ
p?(st) <∞.
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This concept coincides with the one we adopt if,
and only if, the endowment process is uniformly
bounded from above and uniformly bounded away
from zero.33
A.1. Lemma 3.3
Lemma 3.3 is in the spirit of Lemma 2 in Bloise
and Reichlin (2011) but cannot be compared to it.
To illustrate this we state below their result using
our terminology.
Lemma A.1 (Lemma 2 in Bloise and Reichlin
(2011)). Assume aggregate endowments are uni-
formly bounded from above. Consider an allocation
c = (ci)i∈I that is feasible, self-enforcing, individ-
ually rational and uniformly bounded away from
zero. If c is constrained Pareto efficient, then it
does not satisfy the Modified Cass Criterion.
On one hand, we do not restrict attention to allo-
cations that are uniformly bounded away from zero.
On the other hand, we have a stronger assump-
tion (uniform gains to trade) but their conclusion
is weaker than ours.
A.2. Lemma 3.4
Lemma 3.4 is in the spirit of Lemma 3 in Bloise
and Reichlin (2011) but cannot be compared to it.
To illustrate this we state below their result using
our terminology.
Lemma A.2 (Lemma 3 in Bloise and Reichlin
(2011)). Assume aggregate endowments are uni-
formly bounded from above. Consider an alloca-
tion that is constrained Malinvaud efficient and uni-
formly bounded away from zero. If it does not sat-
isfy the Weak Modified Cass Criterion, then it is
constrained Pareto efficient.
On one hand, the sufficient condition we pro-
posed in Lemma 3.4 is valid for any constrained Ma-
linvaud efficient allocations, not necessarily those
that are uniformly bounded away from zero. On
the other hand, the sufficient condition of Lemma
3 in Bloise and Reichlin (2011) is weaker than ours.
33In the sense that there exists ε > 0 such that 1/ε ≤
e(st) ≤ ε for any event st.
A.3. Proposition 3.1
Proposition 3.1 is in the spirit of Proposition 3
in Bloise and Reichlin (2011) that we state below
using our terminology.
Proposition A.1 (Proposition 3 in Bloise and Re-
ichlin (2011)). Assume aggregate endowments are
uniformly bounded from above, uniformly bounded
away from zero, and there are uniform gains to
trade. Consider an allocation that is constrained
Malinvaud efficient and uniformly bounded away
from zero. It is constrained Pareto efficient if, and
only if, implied interest rates are high.
First, Bloise and Reichlin (2011) only character-
ize the sub-class of allocations that are uniformly
bounded away from zero. To guarantee that feasi-
ble allocations are uniformly bounded away from
zero, Bloise et al. (2013) imposed an additional
boundary condition on u and β. In the following
section we discuss how restrictive this condition is.
Second, they assume that aggregate endowments
are uniformly bounded from above and uniformly
bounded away from zero. They need these addi-
tional assumptions because their approach to prove
the necessity part (see their Lemma 5) requires that
marginal utilities of consumption at constrained
Pareto efficient allocations are uniformly bounded
from above and uniformly bounded away from zero.
A.4. Boundary Condition of Bloise et al. (2013)
In Bloise et al. (2013), the following extra-
conditions are imposed on primitives.
(B) The Bernoulli function is bounded from below
(i.e., u(0) ∈ R) and there exists ε > 0 such
that
B.1. ε ≤ ei(st) ≤ 1/(ε#I) for every i and st;
B.2. βu(0) + (1− β)u(1/ε) < u(ε).
In this paper, we only assume that the endowment
process is strictly positive, i.e., ei(st) > 0. In
particular, we allow for the possibility of succes-
sive negative (positive) shocks on endowments such
that ei converge to 0 (to infinite) along some path.
Moreover, we do not impose any consistency re-
quirement between the subjective discount factor β,
the Bernoulli function u and endowments. Observe
that for any given pair (β, u), we can construct
an endowment process (ei)I∈I satisfying (B.1) but
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such that (B.2) is not satisfied. Indeed, (B.2) im-
plies that
u(1/ε) <
β
1− β [u(ε)− u(0)] + u(ε).
Passing to the limit when ε tends to 0, we get a
contradiction: supx≥0 u(x) ≤ u(0).
A.5. Theorem 4.1
Our characterization result Theorem 4.1 extends
Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 in Bloise and Re-
ichlin (2011) since we identify a necessary and suffi-
cient condition without imposing the additional re-
quirement that there exist uniform gains to trade.
To provide a direct comparison with the conditions
used by Bloise and Reichlin (2011), we introduce
the following concept.
Definition A.1. A constrained Malinvaud alloca-
tion c is said to almost satisfy the Modified
Cass Criterion if either it does satisfy the Mod-
ified Cass Criterion, or there exists ε¯ > 0 and a
neighborhood W (for the product topology) of the
allocation c such that for every ε ∈ (0, ε¯), any ε-
constrained Malinvaud efficient allocation in the
neighborhood W of c satisfies the Modified Cass
Criterion.34
We rephrase our Theorem 4.1 to characterize con-
strained Pareto inefficiency.
Theorem A.1. Assume that each endowment pro-
cess ei belongs to `∞. Consider a constrained Mal-
invaud efficient allocation that is uniformly bounded
away from zero. It is constrained Pareto inefficient
if, and only if, it almost satisfies the Modified Cass
Criterion.
Combining the above theorem and Lemma 2 in
Bloise and Reichlin (2011), we deduce that for any
allocation that is constrained Malinvaud efficient
and uniformly bounded away from zero, if it satis-
fies the Modified Cass Criterion, then it also almost
satisfies the Modified Cass Criterion. The converse
is not always valid as illustrated by the following
example.
34Without any loss of generality, the pair (ε¯,W ) can be
chosen such that, for some large enough time period τ , the
set W is composed of all allocations c˜ satisfying |c˜i(st) −
ci(st)| < ε¯ for every i and any event st with t ≤ τ .
Example A.1. Consider the following determinis-
tic economy borrowed from Appendix B of Bloise
and Reichlin (2011). There are two agents I =
{e, o} (e for even and o for odd). Let xe > 0 and
xo > 0 satisfy xe+xo = 1 and u
′(xe) = βu′(xo). Fix
a strictly positive and strictly decreasing sequence
(ξt)t≥0 satisfying
u(xe) + βu(xo) = u(xe + ξt)− βu(xo − ξt+1).
The autarchic allocation e = (ee, eo) is defined by
ee := (xe + ξ0, xo − ξ1, xe + ξ2, xo − ξ3, . . .)
and
eo := (xo − ξ0, xe + ξ1, xo − ξ2, xe + ξ3, . . .).
Bloise and Reichlin (2011) proved that the
autarchic allocation e is constrained Pareto ineffi-
cient. In particular, it almost satisfies the Modified
Cass Criterion. We claim that it does not satisfy
the Modified Cass Criterion. Indeed, assume by
way of contradiction that there exists a non-null,
non-negative and uniformly bounded from above
sequence v = (vt)t≥0 satisfying, for some ρ ∈ (0, 1),
ρ
p?t+1
p?t
vt+1 ≥ vt, for all t ≥ 0.
Observe that implied Arrow–Debreu prices satisfy
p?t+1
p?t
= β
u′(xo − ξt+1)
u′(xe + ξt)
:= qt+1.
Fix any β′ ∈ (β, 1). Since limt→∞ qt+1 = 1,
there exists a time period τ large enough such that
βqt+1 ≤ β′ for every t ≥ τ . We then deduce that
v = 0 and get a contradiction.
Combining Theorem A.1 and Lemma 3 in Bloise
and Reichlin (2011), we deduce that for any alloca-
tion that is constrained Malinvaud efficient and uni-
formly bounded away from zero, if it almost satisfies
the Modified Cass Criterion, then it also satisfies
the Weak Modified Cass Criterion. The converse is
not always valid. Indeed, consider the stationary
Markovian economy of Section 4.3 with σ = σm.
The autarchic allocation is constrained Pareto effi-
cient. In particular, it does not almost satisfy the
Modified Cass Criterion. However, it does satisfy
the Weak Modified Cass Criterion since the risk-less
interest rate is zero.
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